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Abstract
This paper studies a setting in which multiple suppliers compete for a buyer’s
procurement business. The buyer faces uncertain demand and there is a require-
ment to reserve capacity in advance of knowing the demand. Each supplier has
costs that are two dimensional, with some costs incurred before demand is realized
in order to reserve capacity and some costs incurred after demand is realized at
the time of delivery. A distinctive feature of our model is that the marginal costs
may not be constants, and this naturally leads us to a supply function competition
framework in which each supplier offers a schedule of prices and quantities. We
treat this problem as an example of a general class of capacity games and show
that, when the optimal supply chain profit is submodular, in equilibrium the buyer
makes a reservation choice that maximizes the overall supply chain profit, each
supplier makes a profit equal to their marginal contribution to the supply chain,
and the buyer takes the remaining profit. We further prove that this submodularity
property holds under two commonly studied settings: (1) there are only two sup-
pliers; and (2) in the case of more than two suppliers, the marginal two-dimension
costs of each supplier are non-decreasing and constant, respectively.
Keywords: capacity game, supply function, option contract, submodularity,
Nash equilibrium
1 Introduction
When demand is uncertain, the characteristics of the supply chain and the contract
arrangements will determine investment decisions. In capital-intensive industries, such
as petrochemical, electronics and semiconductors, manufacturers need to invest heavily
in building capacity and the lead times are long (Kleindorfer and Wu, 2003), so that
it remains a critical challenge to incentivize and manage capacity investment. When
manufacturers are competing against each other and a buying firm may switch to a
different manufacturer, the problems are intensified. If the financial risks from investment
are carried by the firms who build capacity, it is difficult to find good solutions as there is
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no certainty on how much capacity will be required in the future (Wu et al., 2005a). The
result may be that capacity is only built for the part of the demand that can be more or less
guaranteed: this conservative approach will reduce the buyer’s ability to meet customers’
demand. From a supply chain perspective, it is usually preferable for buyers to reserve
capacity from suppliers in advance, with a payment made to the suppliers associated with
this capacity reservation. Then the buyer also shares the risk that demand is low and
not all the purchased capacity is required.
We model capacity reservation in a supply option framework. In the first stage, before
knowing the actual demand, a buyer reserves a certain amount of capacity by paying a
reservation price. In the second stage, after discovering the actual demand, the buyer
asks for supply up to the lesser of the reserved amount and the observed demand. At
this stage, the buyer pays an execution price only for the amount of capacity that is
used. The underlying assumption of this model is that suppliers have to install capacity,
or place orders with their own suppliers, before demand materializes because of the lead
times involved.
A distinctive feature of our model is that marginal costs (of capacity and production)
may depend on the volume, which is often the case in practical situations. For example,
capacity investment often involves a one-off setup cost (Luss, 1982; Van Mieghem, 2003),
there may be (dis)economies of scale in production (Haldi and Whitcomb, 1967; Ha et al.,
2011), or in cases where a supplier manages a portfolio of facilities with heterogeneous
technologies the overall cost is far from being linear (especially in the electricity indus-
try). In our model, each supplier has a total reservation cost (incurred before demand
realization), which is an arbitrary increasing function of the capacity reserved, and also a
total execution cost (incurred after demand realization), which is an arbitrary increasing
function of the amount actually supplied. This framework includes constant marginal
costs as a special case, so our model is flexible enough to capture many practical settings
in terms of cost modelling. We believe this is an important theoretical advancement
as most literature on supply chain contracts assumes constant marginal costs (Cachon,
2003). The linear treatment may help simplify the analysis and develop high-level intu-
itions especially for competitive models, but may not align with real-world practices.
With constant marginal costs, it is plausible to focus on simple contract forms, but
with general cost functions, more sophisticated contract formats may be worthwhile,
such as bids which specify a schedule of different prices for different quantities (i.e., a
supply function). This type of supply function bid often occurs in practice through the
application of some form of quantity discount contract.
In this paper, we consider a supply chain with a single buyer and multiple suppliers,
who supply a homogeneous item to the buyer. The suppliers compete by offering price
functions for both reservation and execution. Given the suppliers’ bids, the buyer first
reserves capacity before knowing the actual demand, and then decides how much capacity
to use after observing the demand. The buyer may choose not to enter into a contract
with a specific supplier in which case no costs are incurred by that supplier. Competition
with function bids fits well with the situation where a buyer does not stipulate the specific
bidding format in its Request for Quote (RFQ), so that suppliers can bid in whatever
format they like.
We suppose that the buyer faces a random demand, with a known distribution. There
are n suppliers, and each has a total reservation cost, which is expressed as a general
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increasing function of the amount reserved, as well as a total execution cost which is a
general increasing function of the amount supplied. We model this game in a Stackelberg
framework, where the suppliers are leaders and the buyer is a follower. Each supplier
has complete information about the buyer’s demand distribution and all supplier costs,
but the buyer may not know the suppliers’ costs. This assumption has been widely used
in supplier competition models and is appropriate for industries where the operating
environments are more transparent and/or the production technologies are more mature
such as electricity, electronics and semiconductors (Wu and Kleindorfer, 2005; Mart´ınez-
de Albe´niz and Simchi-Levi, 2009; Anderson et al., 2017).
Reservation ExecutionBidding
Suppliers each 
offer a function 
bid
Buyer reserves from 
suppliers and pays 
the reservation prices
Buyer sells the 
product to 
consumers
Buyer decides how 
much to use and pays the 
execution prices
Demand 
uncertainty is 
resolved
Time 4Time 3Time 1Time 0 Time 2
Figure 1: The timeline
The sequence of events is depicted in Figure 1. First each supplier, with the aim of
maximizing their own expected profits, offers a function bid consisting of a (marginal)
reservation price function and a (marginal) execution price function to the buyer. Second,
prior to knowing the actual demand, the buyer determines how much to reserve from each
supplier and pays the reservation price. After demand is observed, the buyer chooses what
capacity to use and pays the execution price for the amount of capacity that is used. If the
demand exceeds the total amount of reserved capacity, there will be lost sales. Finally,
the buyer sells the product to the consumer market at the retail price ρ. We will call
this the capacity game with function bids. This game can be considered as a special case
of a general capacity game setting, in which a first stage choice by the buyer implies a
constraint on the decisions to be made by the buyer at a second stage when demand
information becomes known. Thus, our discussion will be carried out for the general
capacity game, which in turn provides a theoretical foundation for the capacity game
with function bids.
The framework we consider also applies to capacity mechanisms in electricity mar-
kets. In this context the buyer and customers are replaced by a set of consumers and a
system operator who aims to maximize system welfare. Problems of this form are usually
formulated with a value of lost load (VoLL). In the case where demand is stochastic but
independent of price, the system operator’s problem, of minimizing the expected cost of
procurement less VoLL for demand not met, becomes equivalent to maximizing VoLL
times (demand met) minus the cost of procurement, which is the same as the buyer’s
problem in our supply chain setting when we set the retail price to be VoLL.
It is not uncommon to have a supply chain where multiple suppliers act as Stackelberg
leaders and a buyer must select amongst the available suppliers on the basis of contracts
that the suppliers offer. This framework will lead to suppliers setting as high a price as
they can while still being chosen. The consequence is that each supplier makes a bid that
leads to the buyer being indifferent between choosing or not choosing the supplier. From
3
this it can be shown that the profit available to each supplier is simply its contribution
to the overall supply chain profit, i.e., the difference in the supply chain profits when it
is chosen and when it is not.
A major contribution of this paper is to study submodularity in this setting. We
will demonstrate that a natural sufficient condition for a well-behaved equilibrium is that
the supply chain profits are submodular in terms of the set of suppliers available. This
property is equivalent to a requirement that the profit available to a supplier cannot
increase if a new supplier is added to those available. We are therefore led to considering
whether or not the supply chain profits achieved are submodular. This is not always
the case, but can be established in commonly studied settings. Specifically, the property
holds if either: (i) there are only two suppliers; or (ii) each supplier’s marginal reservation
cost is non-decreasing and marginal execution cost is constant.
A second contribution of this paper is to study how suppliers compete with each
other by using supply functions rather than scalar prices. In other words, the strategy
space of each supplier is extended to a function space, and as a result, the suppliers have
more flexibility in their bidding decisions. On the other hand, the buyer can determine
how much to reserve from each supplier (i.e., pick any point from a supply function)
rather than being restricted to a fixed quantity-payment contract. Our aim is to develop
an understanding of the players’ strategic behavior in such a market setting. Previous
models have focused on competition problems when suppliers are restricted to a simple
strategy space (i.e., scalar decision variables, including prices, quantities, lead times,
quality, or specific contract types). To the best of our knowledge, this paper is among
the first to study supply function competition in a capacity reservation setting.
We find that given knowledge of the other suppliers’ bids, it is optimal for each sup-
plier to set execution prices at execution costs and make profits only through the buyer’s
reservation payment. Our findings also show that, under some reasonable assumptions,
there exists a continuum of equilibria in which the suppliers charge costs only for the
execution prices but add a margin to the reservation costs. Despite the multiplicity of
equilibrium bidding strategies, the equilibrium outcome is essentially unique: in equilib-
rium the buyer makes a reservation choice that maximizes the overall supply chain profit,
each supplier makes a profit that is equal to their marginal contribution to the supply
chain, and the buyer takes the remaining profit.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After a review of the relevant literature
in Section 2, we present our general capacity game model in Section 3, and study the best
response and equilibrium strategies for suppliers in Sections 4. Then we show how these
results apply to the more specific case we have introduced above in Section 5. We discuss
in Section 6 two commonly studied settings and show that the supply chain optimal profit
is submodular in a broad class of capacity games with function bids. Finally, we conclude
in Section 7. All technical proofs are presented in the appendix.
2 Literature review
Supply options have been extensively studied in the operations management literature
(see, e.g., Barnes-Schuster et al., 2002; Burnetas and Ritchken, 2005; Wu et al., 2005b; Fu
et al., 2010; Secomandi and Wang, 2012). An initial step is to investigate a buyer’s optimal
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purchasing decision given a fixed set of supply options (see, e.g., Mart´ınez-de Albe´niz
and Simchi-Levi, 2005). As an extension of this, several papers examine option contract
design problems in a Stackelberg game between a buyer and a supplier with a focus on the
interaction between option markets and spot markets (see, e.g., Wu et al., 2002; Pei et al.,
2011). Further extensions have been made to consider supplier competition in an option
market (Wu and Kleindorfer, 2005; Mart´ınez-de Albe´niz and Simchi-Levi, 2009; Anderson
et al., 2017). Wu and Kleindorfer (2005) study a commodity procurement problem where
an industrial buyer purchases supply options from a small set of suppliers, while having
access to an open spot market. No reservation cost at the suppliers is considered, and the
buyer’s downward-sloping demand (arising from utilization maximization) is determined
by the spot price and the execution prices. Such a demand modelling approach allows
the buyer to rank suppliers by using a single price index combining the reservation and
execution price of supply options, which leads to a Bertrand type of equilibrium for the
suppliers. We study a similar situation but consider suppliers having a two-dimensional
cost and a newsvendor type buyer facing uncertain demand.
The closest papers to ours within this literature are Mart´ınez-de Albe´niz and Simchi-
Levi (2009) (hereafter, “MS”) and Anderson et al. (2017) (hereafter, “ACS”). MS studies
a setting where marginal costs are constants and each supplier chooses a reservation price
and an execution price for their limitless capacity. They show that there may be efficiency
loss in equilibrium, which is up to 25% of the overall supply chain optimal profit. Our
paper differs from MS by considering general cost functions and allowing suppliers to
submit function bids. By enlarging the strategy space of suppliers, we find a relatively
clean and intuitive result as discussed earlier. In particular, when the supply chain
optimal profit is submodular, there is no efficiency loss in equilibrium and each supplier
makes a profit equal to their marginal contributions. We further show that this condition
is not restrictive as it holds under some commonly studied settings. Comparing with MS,
we also find that allowing suppliers to offer a function bid makes the buyer worse off,
thereby highlighting the significant impact of the strategy space on equilibrium outcomes.
ACS studies a similar problem where each supplier owns a block of capacity with the
same size and the buyer must reserve all of a block or none. Our general framework of
capacity games covers the model by ACS as a special case since we can recover ACS by
restricting the buyer’s capacity choice from each supplier to be either zero or the block
size. In this respect, our paper generalizes ACS by studying a situation where the buyer
can reserve any amount from each supplier and suppliers can charge different prices for
different quantities.
This paper studies a situation where suppliers compete with each other by offering a
function bid, and this resembles what is studied in the supply function equilibrium (SFE)
literature (Klemperer and Meyer, 1989; Anderson and Philpott, 2002; Anderson and Hu,
2008; Johari and Tsitsiklis, 2011). However, the game type is different. Our model is a
Stackelberg game with multiple leaders (i.e., suppliers) and one follower (i.e., buyer), and
the buyer strategically responds to the supplier offers. In contrast, the SFE literature
focuses on Nash games that aim to study the strategic interaction between multiple
firms, and this literature does not involve a profit-maximizing buyer. In other words,
we examine the buyer’s optimization problem explicitly; while in the SFE literature, the
buyer’s problem is to choose a clearing price to equate the total supply with the demand,
and each supplier’s best response is characterized by a differential equation. In addition,
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our capacity games involve the buyer making a two-stage decision and each supplier
submits a two-dimensional bid consisting of a reservation price function and execution
price function, which is not considered in the SFE literature.
This work is also related to the multi-unit auction literature. Problems of decentral-
ized resource allocation (Klagnanam and Parkes, 2004) are central to auctions. A subset
of this literature examines the efficiency and profit allocation of a given type of auc-
tion, for example, share auction (Wilson, 1979), menu auction (Bernheim and Whinston,
1986), split award auction (Anton and Yao, 1989, 1992), discriminatory price auction
(Menezes and Monteiro, 1995), and uniform price auction (Bresky, 2013). Those papers
generally assume that the total purchase amount of a buyer is exogenously given, while
in our model it is endogenously determined by the buyer based on the supplier bids.
Furthermore, we study capacity reservation games where the buyer’s capacity reservation
problem is a two-stage stochastic program, which is new to this literature.
Finally, the equilibrium profit allocation obtained in this paper is of Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) style, so it is instructive to discuss the key point of departure from VCG
models (Vickrey, 1961; Rothkopf et al., 1990). Those models study profit allocation from
a mechanism design perspective: the VCG profit allocation is an outcome that arises
from the payment rule. In essence the VCG approach selects bids that maximize system
welfare, and pays according to each bidder’s contribution (i.e., the difference between
system welfare with and without that bidder). With this setup the equilibrium result is
for bidders to bid truthfully and the auction result is efficient. The model we propose
uses the same bid selection approach, but pays as bid. It is then an equilibrium (in the
case with submodularity) for the bidders to mark up by the exact VCG amounts. We
still get an efficient auction result, but without truthful bids. This is a different approach
and has some advantages over the usual VCG mechanism. Hobbs et al. (2000) and
Rothkopf (2007) amongst others have discussed some of the difficulties of using a VCG
auction in practice. Many of these problems are resolved with pay-as-bid prices. For
example, in the auction format we discuss, there is not the same incentive for the buyer
to encourage bids that will not be accepted with the aim of reducing the payments to the
successful bidders. Note that a submodularity condition has also been discussed in the
VCG framework by Ausubel and Milgrom (2006), who show that this condition reduces
the problems ordinarily associated with VCG. Within the mechanism design literature,
several papers study multi-dimensional bidding environments in an electricity context,
where the focus is on designing scoring and payment rules that incentivize bidders to
truthfully reveal their costs (Bushnell and Oren, 1994; Chao and Wilson, 2002; Schummer
and Vohra, 2003).
3 Model setup
The problem we study is an example of a broader class of capacity games, in which
the suppliers offer bids, then a buyer selects a capacity amount to buy from each supplier,
then depending on the outcome of a random variable (the demand) in the second stage,
the choice of amounts to buy is made by the buyer (with amounts constrained by the
capacity already bought). The revenue to the buyer is a function of demand and the
amounts bought. We are not considering risk aversion, so we can use the expected payoff
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as the objective for the buyer and the suppliers. Supplier i faces costs that are the sum
of a capacity cost and an execution cost. We will establish our results in this general
framework and then apply this to the model described in the introduction section.
The buyer makes capacity decisions t = (t1, . . . , tn), where capacity ti is restricted to
lie in a set Ti ⊆ R+, and hence t ∈ T = T1 × T2 × · · · × Tn. We assume that each Ti
is compact containing 0 and is specified as part of the capacity game. Typically, Ti is
a closed interval [0, d¯i] or Ti = {0,Wi}, which corresponds to the case where the buyer
either does not use this supplier, or uses the full amount Wi of the supplier.
The capacity payment to be made by the buyer to each supplier can depend on the
complete set of capacity decisions t, which may occur in practice, for example, when the
suppliers have some exclusivity clauses. Note that, we are making our model as general
as possible, although in the specific applications of our model considered in Section 5,
the capacity payment made to a supplier depends only on the buyer’s choice from that
supplier. In the second stage, after demand D ∈ D becomes known, there is a set of
amounts (execution quantities) s ∈ T chosen by the buyer, where s depends on the
observed demand D and satisfies constraints imposed by the capacity decisions of the
first stage. Thus we have s ∈ X(t) for some set X(t) ⊆ T. We require that if ti = 0
then si = 0. The case that is most natural is to allow any selection at the second
stage that is no more than the capacity purchase at the first stage, so that s ≤ t and
X(t) = {s : si ≤ ti, i ∈ N}. In general, however, we only assume X(t) is compact.
Then supplier i decides on two payment functions Ri(·) and Pi(·) that the buyer will be
offered, where Ri(t) is the payment made to supplier i when the buyer makes a capacity
reservation of t, and Pi(s) is the payment made to supplier i given execution amounts s.
In the formulation of the game there may be restrictions on the bids allowed, which we
capture by specifying an allowed set of functions Ai, i ∈ N , and restrict the supplier’s
choice to Ri(·) ∈ Ai and Pi(·) ∈ Ai. Since the buyer can decide not to include supplier
i, in which case no payment is made, the feasible bids Ai have the property that for all
Ri(·) ∈ Ai, Ri(t) = 0 whenever ti = 0 (similarly for Pi(·)). For maximal generality of our
model, we specify only the minimal further restrictions on Ai at the end of this section.
Besides payments made by the buyer to the suppliers, we also have costs Ei(t) and
Ci(s) incurred by supplier i that may depend on the complete set of capacities purchased
and amounts executed. This occurs when competing players can partially collaborate
(e.g., they share warehouse facilities or transport links). However, in the capacity game,
a supplier’s costs may be independent of other suppliers’ quantities, as in our specific
applications considered in Section 5. We assume that these costs are zero if supplier i is
not used at either stage and hence Ei(t) = 0 when ti = 0, and Ci(s) = 0 when si = 0.
Finally, we have the expected revenue V (D, s) to the buyer from an external source,
which depends on the demand D and the execution amounts s. Rather than include a
restriction that the total execution amounts are no more than the demand (i.e.,
∑
i∈N si ≤
D), we will assume that this is achieved through setting appropriate values for the revenue
function V .
Example 1. We consider an example that illustrates the range of modelling applications
for the general capacity game. Consider a buyer facing uncertain demand: 50 with
probability 0.5 and 100 with probability 0.5. There are two suppliers with identical cost
structures who produce products that are fully substitutable. We take T1 = T2 = [0, 100].
Each supplier has costs of reservation for an amount t of capacity given by t2/150 with
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an additional fixed cost of $20 associated with building a transport link. This fixed cost
is split between any suppliers who have capacity reserved, so it is $20 if just one supplier
is used, and otherwise $10 each. Thus the reservation costs are
Ei(t) =
{
t2i /150 + 20− 10χ(tj), j 6= i, if ti > 0;
0, if ti = 0;
where the indicator function χ(tj) = 1 if tj > 0, and 0 otherwise. Execution costs are $1
per unit so that Ci(s) = si. Customers pay an amount $3 per unit and in addition there
are fixed costs at the buyer of $20 for each product that apply only if that product is
supplied. Thus, V (D, s) = 3 min(D, s1 + s2)− 20χ(s1)− 20χ(s2). We have the standard
form for X(t) so there is a restriction that si ≤ ti. 
Since execution amounts will depend on D, we can write a policy for the buyer as
(t, s(·)), where t ∈ T and s(·) is a function from the demand set D to T, taking the value
s(D) at D. For simplicity, we will write s for s(·) hereafter. The total expected buyer
profit with this policy choice is
ΠB(t, s) = E[V (D, s(D))−
∑
i∈N
(Pi(s(D)) +Ri(t))],
given a set of supplier bids B = {(Pi(·), Ri(·)) ∈ Ai : i ∈ N}. The buyer’s problem is
to maximize her expected profit by choosing an optimal reservation choice t and a set of
execution amounts s(D) for each possible demand D ∈ D, i.e., to solve
max {ΠB(t, s) : t ∈ T, s(D) ∈ X(t) for all D ∈ D} . (1)
With these bids and buyer choice (t, s), supplier i has a profit of
pii(t, s) = E [Ri(t)− Ei(t) + Pi(s(D))− Ci(s(D))] , i ∈ N. (2)
The supply chain profit is
ΠC(t, s) = ΠB(t, s) +
∑
i∈N
pii(t, s)
= E[V (D, s(D))−
∑
i∈N
(Ci(s(D)) + Ei(t))], (3)
which is independent of the bids made.
We write I(t) = {i : ti > 0} for the support of a vector t. We use Π∗C(S), S ⊆ N ,
to denote the optimal supply chain profit when the capacity reserved is restricted to be
zero outside the set S. Thus
Π∗C(S) = max {ΠC(t, s) : t ∈ T, s(D) ∈ X(t) for all D ∈ D, I(t) ⊆ S} . (4)
Similarly, given a set of supplier bids B = {(Pi(·), Ri(·)) ∈ Ai : i ∈ N}, we use Π∗B(S),
S ⊆ N , to denote the optimal buyer profit when the capacity reserved is restricted to be
zero outside the set S. Thus
Π∗B(S) = max {ΠB(t, s) : t ∈ T, s(D) ∈ X(t) for all D ∈ D, I(t) ⊆ S} .
The maximizations above are taken over t ∈ T (a vector) and s(·) ∈ X(t) (a function).
To ensure that the maxima exist and are attained, we make the following (additional)
assumptions: (a) the set-valued function X(t) is upper hemi-continuous; (b) the revenue
function V (t, s) is upper semi-continuous in both arguments; and (c) the set Ai of possible
bids is such that Pi(·), Ri(·) ∈ Ai are lower semi-continuous.
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4 Best response and equilibrium behavior
We now look at each supplier’s best response problem. As a Stackelberg leader, each
supplier is able to anticipate the buyer’s reservation choice provided that the competitors’
bids are observed. Since the buyer’s optimization problem is embedded in the suppliers’
best responses, we need to specify the buyer’s choice when there are different options
with the same expected value to the buyer. We say that supplier i has preferred status
when a solution with ti > 0 is chosen by the buyer even if other options give the same
value.
Theorem 1 (Best Response). For any fixed supplier i ∈ N , we have the following state-
ments for the supplier’s best response:
(a) Given bids {(Pj(·), Rj(·)) : j ∈ N, j 6= i}, the profit for supplier i is no more than
Zi = Π
∗
Bi(N)− Π∗Bi(N\{i}),
where Bi = {(Pj(·), Rj(·)) : j ∈ N, j 6= i} ∪ {(Ci(·), Ei(·))}.
(b) If Zi > 0 and supplier i has preferred status, then the profit Zi is achieved by the
offer (P¯i(·), R¯i(·)) defined by:
P¯i(s) = Ci(s), and
R¯i(t) = Ei(t) + Zi when ti > 0, R¯i(t) = 0 when ti = 0.
(c) If Zi > 0, then for any  > 0, an offer of
(
P¯i(·), R¯()i (·)
)
will achieve within  of the
maximum possible supplier profit, where R¯
()
i (t) = R¯i(t)− .
Theorem 1 shows the maximum profit for a supplier i, which is the increase in profit
available to the buyer from including the bids of supplier i when these are made at
cost. Moreover, when optimizing for the supplier, it is sufficient to consider supplier bids
that are at cost for the execution component and make money only from the reservation
payments. However, we should note that the expected profit to the supplier is unaffected
by parts of the function bids that are never selected by the buyer whatever demand
occurs. The consequence is that there are a continuum of other best response function
offers available.
Now let us consider the equilibrium strategies for suppliers. In general, the optimal
solution to the buyer’s maximization problem (1) is not unique at an equilibrium as we
shall show later. Since our focus is on supplier competition, and each supplier’s payoff
depends on the buyer’s reservation choice, we need a tie-breaking rule to pin down the
buyer’s optimal choice in case of multiple solutions. The suppliers have an interest in
raising prices to the point where the buyer is about to drop them from consideration.
Therefore, a tie-breaking assumption is critical, otherwise, we can have a difficulty in
defining optimal behavior for the suppliers, as a type of -optimality could occur when a
supplier sets his price just below a benchmark value at which the buyer no longer wishes
to select the supplier. Consequently, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 (Tie-Breaking Rule). In case of multiple optimal solutions, the buyer will
select the one that gives the largest supply chain profit.
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This assumption is in line with that for the classic Bertrand competition model, where
the firm with the lowest cost wins when all the firms charge the same price. The rationale
of this assumption is as follows: if the buyer selects an alternative that gives a lower supply
chain profit, then keeping the other suppliers’ bids unchanged, any supplier in the supply
chain optimal set (with respect to the buyer’s equally good choices) will have incentives
to raise his price by an amount that is smaller than the difference between the supply
chain optimal profit and the one corresponding to the buyer’s choice. This would make
both the buyer and the supplier better off.
We need to rule out cases where two suppliers are identical and the optimal supply
chain solution can use either one or the other, so we introduce the following assumption.
Assumption 2 (Uniqueness of Support). All the supply chain optimal capacity choices
use the same set of suppliers.
We will write (t∗S, s
∗
S) to denote an optimal solution to the supply chain optimization
problem (4). So Assumption 2 amounts to a statement that the support I(t∗N) of the
supply chain optimal capacity choices t∗N is unique. Let us identify the suppliers who
make a contribution to the optimal supply chain profit by defining
N∗(C) = {j ∈ N : Π∗C(N) > Π∗C(N\{j})},
N∗−i(C) = {j ∈ N : Π∗C(N\{i}) > Π∗C(N\{i, j})}.
It is easy to observe that, under Assumption 2, we have
I(t∗N) = N
∗(C). (5)
To establish an equilibrium, we will need to make use of submodularity of the optimal
supply chain profit as a set function of the suppliers available, where the submodularity
property states that, for any i, j ∈ S ⊆ N and i 6= j,
Π∗C(S)− Π∗C(S \ {i}) ≤ Π∗C(S \ {j})− Π∗C(S \ {i, j}). (6)
Inequalities (6) are satisfied for a large class of problems of interest, as we shall discuss
in detail in Section 6. It is convenient to make this property an assumption:
Assumption 3 (Submodularity). The supply chain optimal profit Π∗C(S) is submodular
as a function of the set S ⊆ N of available suppliers.
This submodularity assumption implies two properties of the set function Π∗C(·), which
are established in the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1. Under the Submodularity Assumption, the following inequality holds for any
S ⊆ N :
Π∗C(N)− Π∗C(S) ≥
∑
i∈N\S
(Π∗C(N)− Π∗C(N \ {i})) . (7)
The following result shows that all the suppliers in N∗(C) \ {i} will still be included
in the optimal supply chain choice when supplier i is unavailable.
Lemma 2. Under the Submodularity Assumption, for any i ∈ N , we have N∗(C) \ {i} ⊆
N∗−i(C).
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We will consider the possibility of varying the offers that a supplier makes in a way
that does not change the supply chain optimal solutions. We say that a set {∆i(·) : i ∈ N}
of functions from T to R is consistent with the cost functions {(Ci(·), Ei(·)) : i ∈ N} if
adding ∆j(t) to the cost Ej(t) does not change the optimal solution or the optimal value,
i.e., for every S ⊆ N ,
max
{
ΠC(t, s) +
∑
j∈S
∆j(t) : t ∈ T, s ∈ X(t) for all D ∈ D, I(t) ⊆ S
}
= Π∗C(S), (8)
and the maximization is attained at t∗S. It is easy to see that this is equivalent to the
conditions of (a)
∑
j∈S ∆j(t
∗
S) = 0 and (b) if I(t) ⊆ S and s(D) ∈ X(t) for all D ∈ D,
then ∑
j∈S
∆j(t) ≤ Π∗C(S)− ΠC(t, s). (9)
Note that when ∆i(t) is zero for any t, then it is trivially consistent with the costs. Now
we are ready to characterize the equilibrium that occurs when Π∗C(S) is submodular as a
function of S.
Theorem 2 (Nash Equilibrium). If Assumptions 1–3 hold, then the set of bids B¯ =
{(Ci(·), R¯i(·)) : i ∈ N∗(C)} ∪ {(Ci(·), Ei(·)) : i /∈ N∗(C)} is a Nash equilibrium, where
R¯i(t) =
{
Ei(t) + Π
∗
C(N)− Π∗C(N\{i})−∆i(t), if ti > 0;
0, if ti = 0;
and {∆i(·) ≥ 0 : i ∈ N∗(C)} is any set of functions consistent with the costs. In equilib-
rium, the buyer makes a supply chain optimal choice (t∗N , s
∗
N). The buyer makes profit
Π∗C(N)−
∑n
i=1 (Π
∗
C(N)− Π∗C(N \ {i})) and supplier i makes profit Π∗C(N)−Π∗C(N \ {i}).
We can see immediately from Theorem 2 that the following set of bids is a Nash
equilibrium (by setting all ∆i(t) = 0):
R¯i(t) = Ei(t) + Π
∗
C(N)− Π∗C(N\{i}), when ti > 0,
and R¯i(t) = 0 when ti = 0.
Several points about this theorem are worth mentioning. First, the profit allocation
in equilibrium is a VCG result. However, this is not from a mechanism design that sets
prices paid in a particular way, but arises as an equilibrium from our pay-as-bid capacity
game. It is straightforward that each supplier makes a nonnegative profit. Suppliers
in N(C)∗ each make a strictly positive profit while the other suppliers each make zero
profits. On the buyer’s side, the profit is nonnegative, which is a direct result of the
submodularity property of Π∗C(S) and can also be implied by the fact that the buyer will
not purchase from any supplier should it make a negative profit.
The profit allocation is primarily driven by the level of competition between suppliers.
In the extreme case where there is a perfectly competitive market, then each supplier’s
contribution is zero, since in an individual supplier’s absence another supplier will step
in with no overall reduction in supply chain profits. Thus the entire supply chain profit
will go to the buyer.
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Another property of the equilibrium is that the buyer’s profit will remain the same
if any single supplier is dropped from the set of available suppliers. We establish this in
the proof of Theorem 2 (see equation (A-3)). The intuition is that if the buyer makes a
lower profit when any supplier is removed, then this supplier would have an incentive to
increase its bid by a positive amount while still ensuring it is chosen by the buyer.
Finally, in equilibrium the buyer makes a choice that maximizes the supply chain
profit, i.e., the supply chain is coordinated in equilibrium. It is instructive to relate our
findings with those of the supply chain coordination literature (Cachon, 2003). In general,
this literature focuses on designing sophisticated contracts (e.g., revenue sharing or buy
back) to achieve the chain optimal profit in a dyadic supply chain. In contrast, we have
a different supply chain structure (i.e., many to one), and the supply chain optimality
arises as a result of supplier competition (rather than by way of design).
Example 1 (continued). Let us consider again the capacity game given in Example 1.
If just one of the suppliers, say i, is available, then it can be shown that the optimal
reservation amount for the supply chain as a whole is ti = 75 and the supply chain profit
is $47.5. In this case, the amount supplied is less than the demand in the high demand
case. On the other hand, if both suppliers are available, then it is optimal (to the supply
chain) to reserve 50 from each, so t1 = t2 = 50. In this case no demand is lost, but the
buyer finds it worthwhile to purchase from only one of the suppliers in the event that
demand is low (thus saving the additional $20 cost in this case). The supply chain profit
is $66.67. Thus the supply chain profits are submodular and there is an equilibrium
where each supplier offers Pi(s) = si and Ri(t) = Ei(t) + 19.17 for ti > 0 and Ri(t) = 0
otherwise, where i = 1, 2. 
5 Application to capacity games with function bids
We will apply our results for the general capacity game to the specific case we de-
scribed in the introduction section. The buyer faces a random demand D, which follows
a probability distribution F (d) with density f(d) over [d, d¯] where 0 ≤ d < d¯ < ∞.
For each unit of items sold, the buyer collects a revenue ρ. Supplier i has a reservation
cost, which is expressed as a general increasing function of the amount reserved, with a
marginal reservation cost for an amount t given by ei(t) (so that total reservation costs
are given by
∫ t
0
ei(s)ds). In addition supplier i has an execution cost which is a general
increasing function of the amount supplied, with a marginal execution cost of ci(t). We
have switched to lower case letters here as an indication that these are marginal costs
rather than the total costs as occur in the general capacity game. Note that ci(t) and
ei(t) could be constants. Suppliers each maximize their own expected profits by offering
a function bid consisting of a (marginal) reservation price function ri(t) and a (marginal)
execution price function pi(t) for t ∈ [0, t¯]. Without loss of generality, we assume t¯ = d¯
since the buyer will never reserve more than d¯ units. In addition, if a supplier does not
want to offer that much, he may simply set a very high price for the quantities beyond
the desired amount so that the buyer will never choose to reserve more than the supplier
wishes to offer.
Suppose the bids offered by suppliers are B = {(pi(·), ri(·)) : i ∈ N}, where the
functions pi(·) and ri(·) are defined on [0, d¯] and may be constants. The buyer makes
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a reservation decision in the first stage and makes an execution decision in the second
stage. Since the reservation payment becomes sunk at the time when the buyer makes
the execution decision, with any realized demand, the buyer simply chooses the cheapest
way to meet the demand based on execution prices up to the amount reserved from each
supplier. If prices are continuous and less than ρ, then it is not hard to see that the buyer
will meet the demand D through choosing amounts xi from supplier i where
∑
i∈N xi = D
and the prices are all equal so that we may write pi(xi) = p(D), i ∈ N , except where xj
is the reserved capacity for j, in which case pj(xj) ≤ p(D). However in the general case,
when prices can decrease, there may be more than one solution having these properties
even with continuous prices. In this case the buyer will select the solution with the lowest
total payment.
To avoid these complications and allow us to develop explicit expressions for ΠB and
ΠC, we make the following simplifying assumption.
Assumption 4. The execution price function pi(·) is non-decreasing for every i ∈ N .
In order to put this problem into the general form of a capacity game, we need to
switch from marginal costs to the full costs given by their integrals. Also we note that
for the capacity game with function bids, pi, ci, ri and ei only have dependence on ti
and si and not on the full vectors t and s (so that we need to capture the restriction
that bids p and r are of this form through the specification of the sets Ai). Thus by
setting V (D, s) = ρmin(D,
∑
i∈N si), Pi(s) =
∫ si
0
pi(u)du, Ci(s) =
∫ si
0
ci(u)du, Ri(t) =∫ ti
0
ri(u)du, Ei(t) =
∫ ti
0
ei(u)du, we obtain the problem in the required form.
For the capacity game with function bids we can write the vector of second stage
choices s explicitly in terms of t by recognising that the optimal choice for the buyer will
use the low cost suppliers first. As we will demonstrate below, this allows an explicit
expression for
ΠB(t) := max
s≤t
ΠB(t, s) = max
s≤t
E
[
ρmin(D,
∑
i∈N
s(D)i)−
∑
i∈N
(Pi(s(D)i) +Ri(ti))
]
,
where B = {(Pi(·), Ri(·)), i ∈ N} and we write s(D)i for the ith component of s(D).
Similarly we define ΠC(t) := maxs≤t ΠC(t, s). Let
γj(p) = sup{0 ≤ y ≤ tj : pj(y) ≤ p}. (10)
Then γj(pi(x)) is the amount purchased from supplier j 6= i if an amount x is pur-
chased from supplier i. When pj(t) is strictly increasing and continuous, then γj(p) =
min{p−1j (p), tj}. In the special case where marginal execution costs are constant (i.e.,
pk(t) = pk for all k ∈ N where pk is a constant), we have γj(p) = 0 if pj > p, and
γj(p) = tj if pj ≤ p.
Let t−i = (t1, · · · , ti−1, ti+1, · · · , tn) denote the vector of reservation choices from
suppliers other than i. We now write the cumulative amount of capacity with execution
prices less than pi(x) as follows,
hi(x, t−i) = x+
∑
j 6=i
γj(pi(x)), x ∈ [0, ti], (11)
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where γj is defined in (10), the term x indicates the dispatched amount from supplier
i, and the second term represents the dispatched amount from suppliers other than i.
If the buyer chooses optimally then this is the total amount that the buyer purchases
conditional on her purchasing amount x from supplier i. Hence with optimal buyer
choices, the amount purchased from supplier i is greater than x if and only if the demand
is greater than hi(x, t−i).
Thus, with the reservation choice t, the buyer’s optimal expected profit is
ΠB(t) =
n∑
i=1
∫ ti
0
{
[ρ− pi(x)]F¯ (hi(x, t−i))− ri(x)
}
dx, (12)
where B = {(pi(t), ri(t)) : i ∈ N}, hi(·, ·) is given in (11) and F¯ (z) = Pr[D ≥ z]. We
know that F¯ (hi(x, t−i)) represents the probability that the buyer will use the xth unit
of the reserved capacity from supplier i, and thus each term within the summation gives
the buyer’s profit of reserving ti from supplier i. Similarly for the supply chain as a whole
we define
h¯i(x, t−i) = x+
∑
j 6=i
sup{0 ≤ y ≤ tj : cj(y) ≤ ci(x)}, x ∈ [0, ti], (13)
and we have
ΠC(t) =
n∑
i=1
∫ ti
0
{
(ρ− ci(x))F¯ (h¯i(x, t−i))− ei(x)
}
dx. (14)
Now we apply Theorem 1 to get the following corollary in this case.
Corollary 1. Given bids {(pj(·), rj(·)) : j ∈ N, j 6= i} of the other suppliers, if supplier i
has preferred status, then it is optimal for supplier i to set pi(t) = ci(t) for t ∈ [0, d¯] and
choose the function ri(·) such that∫ tˆi
0
ri(t)dt =
∫ tˆi
0
ei(t)dt+ Π
∗
Bi(N)− Π∗Bi(N\{i}),
where Bi = {(pj(·), rj(·)), j ∈ N, j 6= i} ∪ {(ci(·), ei(·))} and tˆ ∈ arg max ΠBi(t) provided
ri(·) is chosen in such a way that the optimal buyer choice is tˆ. An optimal choice for
supplier i is to choose ri(t) = ei(t) for all t ∈ [0, d¯] and in addition charge a fixed amount
of Π∗Bi(N)−Π∗Bi(N\{i}) for any non-zero amount reserved. In the case where supplier i
does not have preferred status, then it is possible for supplier i to achieve within  of the
best profit by choosing the same bid of pi(·) and a bid of ri(·) that is reduced by .
This result shows that for the capacity game with function bids there is an optimal
solution with pi(t) = ci(t) for the supplier i’s best response problem, but there will be
multiple possible solutions for ri(t) such that the buyer’s optimal choice is tˆ and the
supplier makes a profit of Π∗Bi(N)−Π∗Bi(N\{i}) (which will imply that the buyer makes
the same profit as Π∗Bi(N\{i})). In all of these solutions, the optimal buyer choice is tˆ,
which maximizes the buyer’s profit when supplier i charges only his costs.
For the capacity game with function bids we also have the following immediate corol-
lary from Theorem 2.
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Corollary 2 (Nash equilibrium with a lump sum payment). Suppose Assumptions 1–
3 hold. Then there exists a Nash equilibrium {(p∗i (·), r∗i (·), K∗i ) : i ∈ N}, where each
supplier i sets prices to be costs, i.e., p∗i (·) = ci(·), r∗i (·) = ei(·), and charges a lump-sum
reservation payment Π∗C(N)−Π∗C(N\{i}). The buyer’s reservation choice is t∗N , the buyer
makes a profit of Π∗C(N) −
∑n
i=1 Π
∗
C(N) − Π∗C(N\{i}), and supplier i makes a profit of
Π∗C(N)− Π∗C(N\{i}). 
One property of the equilibrium involving a lump sum payment is that it cannot be
represented simply by defining marginal prices for capacity: to do so would require an
infinite price for the first ε of capacity. However, we can use the functions ∆i(t) occurring
in Theorem 2 to construct an equilibrium solution with finite marginal costs. This is done
by adjusting the capacity offer from the lump sum bid by smoothing out the beginning
of the offer. We will make use of power functions to do this.
Proposition 1 (Nash equilibrium with power functions). Suppose Assumptions 1–3 hold.
Further we assume that ci(·) and ei(·) are non-decreasing. Then the following strategies
form a Nash equilibrium: For each i ∈ N , p∗i (·) = ci(·) and
r∗i (t) =
{
ei(t) + δi(t; βi), if 0 ≤ t < θi,
ei(t), if θi ≤ t ≤ d¯,
where
δi(t; βi) = (Π
∗
C(N)− Π∗C(N \ {i}))
(βi + 1)
θi
(
θi − t
θi
)βi
,
θi = min((t
∗
S)i : S ⊆ N,S 3 i), and βi > 1 is a constant large enough. In equi-
librium, the buyer’s reservation choice is t∗N . The buyer makes a profit of Π
∗
C(N) −∑n
i=1 (Π
∗
C(N)− Π∗C(N \ {i})) and supplier i makes a profit of Π∗C(N)− Π∗C(N \ {i}).
This construction involves adding the margin δi(t; βi) to the reservation costs, which
is a decreasing function of t ∈ (0, θi). Choosing a high value for βi will imply that δi(t; βi)
decreases more steeply at the beginning and becomes flatter at the end of this interval.
From Proposition 1, we see that there is a continuum of Nash equilibria with power
functions, each associated with a possible set of βi values. We can show that when
βi approaches positive infinity, the power function bid reduces to the lump sum bid.
Thus, Corollary 2 can be considered as a limiting example of Proposition 1. Moreover,
one may easily construct an equilibrium where some suppliers use lump sum bids (with
infinitely large β values) while others use power function bids. Despite the multiplicity
of equilibrium bidding strategies, all these equilibria lead to the same profit allocation
and thus the equilibrium outcome characterized in Proposition 1 is essentially unique.
Comparison with MS
As discussed earlier, existing models have focused on the case where the marginal
costs are constant. As we will show in Section 6, the supply chain optimal profit is
submodular for this special case, and hence the equilibria characterized in Corollary 2
and Proposition 1 apply. It is interesting to draw a parallel between our model and the
existing ones for this case. To this end, we draw on an example from MS to demonstrate
the difference in equilibrium outcomes.
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Example 2 (Example 1 in MS). The buyer’s demand is uniformly distributed over
[0, 1], so F (t) = t for t ∈ [0, 1]. There are two suppliers and their marginal costs are
(c1, e1) = (0, 60) and (c2, e2) = (75, 5). The retail price is ρ = 100. We now examine the
supply chain optimal problems.
If the buyer reserves from two suppliers, the supply chain problem is:
max
t1, t2∈[0,1]
{∫ t1
0
(
(ρ− c1)F¯ (x)− e1
)
dx+
∫ t2
0
(
(ρ− c2)F¯ (x+ t1)− e2
)
dx
}
.
The optimal solution is t∗N = (4/15, 8/15). The supply chain optimal profit is Π
∗
C(N) =
32/3.
If the buyer chooses supplier 1 only, the supply chain problem is:
max
t1∈[0,1]
{∫ t1
0
(
(ρ− c1)F¯ (x)− e1
)
dx
}
.
The optimal solution is t∗{1} = (2/5) and the supply chain optimal profit is Π
∗
C({1}) = 8.
If the buyer chooses supplier 2 only, the supply chain problem is:
max
t2∈[0,1]
{∫ t2
0
(
(ρ− c2)F¯ (x)− e2
)
dx
}
.
The optimal solution is t∗{2} = (4/5) and the supply chain optimal profit is Π
∗
C({2}) = 8.
If suppliers are restricted to each offering a pair of reservation price and execution
price, in equilibrium these two suppliers bid infinitesimally close to each other. MS show
that the following is a continuum of -equilibria, which are parameterized with p ∈ [50, 75]:
(p∗1, r
∗
1) = (p
∗
2, r
∗
2) =
(
p, 60− 55
75
p
)
.
In equilibria, the buyer’s reservation choice is
t∗ =
(
4
15
,
40
3(100− p)
)
.
The profit split amongst players is given by
Π∗B =
8(150− p)2
225(100− p) , pi
∗
1 =
8p
225
, pi∗2 =
800(75− p)
9(100− p)2 , (15)
and the supply chain profit is given by
Π∗C =
32(225− 2p)
9(100− p) +
800(75− p)
9(100− p)2 .
Note that all the above equilibria are inefficient (i.e., not supply chain optimal) except
the one with p = 75. At this efficient equilibrium, each supplier offers a bid (75, 5) which
is identical to the supplier 2’s cost. The supplier 2’s profit is 0, the supplier 1’s profit is
8/3, and the buyer’s profit equals 8.
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We now demonstrate that the above strategies do not form an equilibrium if we allow
suppliers to offer function bids. Suppose supplier 1 chooses the proposed bid (p∗1, r
∗
1) =
(p, 60− (55/75)p), and we now examine supplier 2’s best response in choosing a function
bid.
First, if supplier 1 is the sole supplier, the buyer’s reserved amount will be the sum
of the two components of t∗, and the buyer’s profit is equal to Π∗B. Therefore, we have
t∗{1} =
600− 4p
15(100− p) and Π
∗
B({1}) =
8(150− p)2
225(100− p) .
Second, we show that the following strategy for supplier 2 improves his profit: setting
prices to be costs and charging a lump-sum payment of 32(75−p)
9(100−p) . Given this offer (and
the supplier 1’s offer (p∗1, r
∗
1)), we can show that the solution for the buyer’s problem is
t˜ =
(
4
15
,
8
15
)
,
and the buyer’s profit from choosing t˜ is equal to Π∗B({1}). Also if the buyer purchases
from only supplier 2, the buyer makes a profit of Π∗B({1}) as well. According to the
tie-breaking rule, the buyer will select t˜. Then supplier 2’s profit becomes
p˜i2 =
32(75− p)
9(100− p) ,
which is strictly greater than pi∗2 for any p < 75. This shows that the equilibria in MS do
not hold if we allow suppliers to offer a function bid.
Under our model setup, the problem is well behaved and there is an equilibrium
with lump-sum payments (and there is also an equilibrium with power functions). The
following bids form a Nash equilibrium (where K1 and K2 are lump sum payments):
(p∗1, r
∗
1, K1) =
(
0, 60,
8
3
)
and (p∗2, r
∗
2, K2) =
(
75, 5,
8
3
)
.
At this equilibria, the buyer’s optimal reservation choice is t∗ = (4/15, 8/15). The profit
split amongst players is given by
Π∗B =
16
3
and pi∗1 = pi
∗
2 =
8
3
. (16)
In this equilibria, each supplier’s profit equals his contribution to the supply chain system
and the buyer takes the remaining profit. Moreover, the reservation choice by the buyer
is supply chain optimal (in distinction to the case with constant prices).
The key message of Example 2 is that imposing the restriction that each supplier
submits a pair of reservation price and an execution price rather than a function bid
leads to a higher buyer profit. On the other hand, the suppliers are better off if they
submit function bids. This can be easily seen by comparing the profit splits at (15) and
(16). 
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Comparison with ACS
In our setting, each supplier offers a function bid with a marginal reservation price
function and a marginal execution price function, and the buyer has the freedom to reserve
whatever amount she likes. This setting resembles the two extensions to the setting with
blocks of capacity discussed in Anderson et al. (2017). The two extensions they discussed
were:
(a) Partial Reservation, in which the buyer is not restricted to reserving a whole block.
Each supplier owns a single block and the blocks can be of different sizes. Every supplier
chooses an execution price and a reservation price that apply to all elements of his block.
(b) Multiple Blocks with Common Owner, in which each supplier owns multiple unit-
blocks and can choose different prices for different unit blocks. The buyer can freely
choose among the offered blocks.
In both extensions, the authors demonstrate that one of their key results in the
baseline model, pi = ci for supplier i’s best response, does not hold. In contrast, we
show that the result pi = ci holds in our setting as shown in Corollary 1.
The key differences are as follows. In the case (a) of partial reservation, the buyer can
freely reserve any amount as in our setting. However, suppliers are restricted to offering
just two scalar prices rather than general function bids. In the case (b) of multiple
blocks with common owner, each supplier can choose different prices for different blocks
of capacity as in our setting. However, the buyer can freely choose any of the blocks,
whereas in our function bidding setting, the buyer does not have as much flexibility,
because the buyer will need to accept the prices for the earlier blocks in order to enjoy
the prices for the next blocks. These differences in results highlight the importance of
each player’s choice flexibility on the equilibrium outcomes.
6 Discussion of submodularity assumption
In this section we examine two commonly studied settings in supply chains: (a) there
are only two suppliers competing for the buyer’s procurement business, and (b) there are
more than two suppliers and the marginal execution costs are constants. In each case we
are interested in establishing conditions that will ensure submodularity of Π∗C(S).
6.1 Case with two suppliers
When there are only two suppliers (denoted by 1 and 2) we can find conditions that
are enough to ensure that submodularity occurs, and it turns out that in the special
case of the capacity game with function bids submodularity will hold without any further
restrictions.
Proposition 2 (Subadditivity). If V (D, s) is subadditive in s and the cost functions are
defined separately on each component, so Ci(s) is determined by the i-th component of s,
and Ei(t) is determined by the i-th component of t, then Π
∗
C(S) is submodular in S ⊆ N .
In the case of the capacity game with function bids, these conditions will hold.
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6.2 Case with constant marginal execution costs
In the case of more than two suppliers, the submodularity of supply chain profit may
not hold in general, as we show in Example 4 below. The following theorem identifies some
sufficient conditions for the submodularity property and these conditions are satisfied for
a large class of the capacity games with function bids. The notion of laminar convexity
stated in the theorem is defined in the Appendix.
Theorem 3 (Submodularity). Let T = [0, d¯]n and X(t) = {s ∈ Rn+ : s ≤ t} for t ∈ T.
If maxs∈X(t) (V (D, s)−
∑n
i=1Ci(s)) is laminar concave in t and each cost function Ei(t)
(i ∈ N) is a convex function of (only) the i-th component of t, then Π∗C(S) is submodular
in S ⊆ N . In the case of the capacity game with function bids, these conditions are
satisfied if for each supplier the marginal execution cost is constant and the marginal
reservation cost is non-decreasing.
The complexity of the analysis arises from the fact that the supply chain profit function
cannot be easily decomposed into components related to individual suppliers. The profit
made from supplier i is related to the capacity reservations from all the suppliers with
lower execution prices.
Theorem 3 implies that, in settings considered by the existing studies where the
marginal costs are constant, the supply chain optimal profit is submodular. We use the
following example to illustrate this point.
Example 3. Suppose the buyer demand D follows a uniform distribution over [0, 1].
There are three suppliers whose costs are: c1 = 1, e1 = 3; c2 = 2.5, e2 = 2; and c3 = 5, e3 =
1. The retail price is ρ = 10. We know from Theorem 3 that the problem is submodular,
and we can carry out the detailed calculations to find the supply chain optimal solutions
for different sets of available suppliers. One way to do these calculations is to use the
screening curve approach that is common in calculation of optimal generation mix in
electricity markets (see Green, 2005). We summarize the optimal reservation choices and
profits in Table 1.
Available Suppliers S (t∗S)1 (t
∗
S)2 (t
∗
S)3 Π
∗
C(S)
{1, 2, 3} 1/3 4/15 1/5 2.1333
{1, 2} 1/3 2/5 0 2.1
{1, 3} 1/2 0 3/10 2.1
{2, 3} 0 3/5 1/5 2.05
{1} 2/3 0 0 2
{2} 0 11/15 0 2.0167
{3} 0 0 4/5 1.6
Table 1: The supply chain optimal reservation choices and profits
Using the results in the table, we can easily check the submodularity of Π∗C(S). We
can now construct an equilibrium set of offers where the suppliers offer at cost and in
addition require a lump sum reservation payment of Π∗C(N) − Π∗C(N\{i}), which then
becomes the supplier profit. Here these amounts are 0.08333 for supplier 1, 0.0333 for
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supplier 2, and 0.0333 for supplier 3. In this equilibrium the buyer receives the remainder
of the total supply chain profit: 2.1333− 0.15 = 1.9833. 
The submodularity property may not hold when suppliers have decreasing marginal
costs as we demonstrate with the following example.
Example 4. Suppose the demand is fixed with D = 10 and the retail price is ρ = 20.
There are three suppliers with N = {1, 2, 3}. Supplier 1 and supplier 2 have the same
costs with c1(t) = c2(t) = e1(t) = e2(t) = 0, for t ∈ [0, 5] (and an infinite cost for any
larger amount). Supplier 3’s costs are c3(t) = 0 and e3(t) = 10− t for t ∈ [0, 10]. So both
supplier 1 and supplier 2 have the capacity of 5 and supplier 3’s capacity is 10.
We now look at the supply chain optimal problems. If all the three suppliers are
available, the buyer will choose 5 units from each of supplier 1 and supplier 2. The
supply chain optimal profit is Π({1, 2, 3}) = 200. If only suppliers 3 and 1 (or 2) are
available, the buyer will choose 5 units from each of 3 and 1 (or 2). The supply chain
optimal profit is Π({1, 3}) = Π({2, 3}) = 162.5. If supplier 3 is the sole supplier, the buyer
will choose 10 units from supplier 3 and the supply chain optimal profit is Π({3}) = 150.
Therefore, we have Π({1, 2, 3}) + Π({3}) = 350 > 325 = Π({1, 3}) + Π({2, 3}), which
contradicts the submodularity property.
We can also show that the proposed equilibrium structure will not apply in this case.
If each of suppliers 1 and 2 asks for a lump-sum payment of 200− 162.5 = 37.5, and the
buyer makes the supply chain optimal choice of selecting these two suppliers, then the
buyer profit is 200−75 = 125. However, this is less than the profit available to the buyer
from selecting supplier 3 alone, which gives the buyer 150 as profit. So this is not an
equilibrium. We can check that an equilibrium exists where both suppliers 1 and 2 ask
for a lump-sum payment of 25, and the buyer chooses both of these offers. 
7 Discussion and conclusions
In this paper, we have developed a general framework to study a broad class of
capacity games. This framework allows us to examine supplier competition in an option
market where suppliers’ costs may be nonlinear. In this setting, suppliers each submit a
function bid consisting of a reservation price function and an execution price function.
The buyer decides how much capacity to reserve from each supplier before knowing the
actual demand.
When the competitors’ bids are observed, we have shown that an optimal strategy
for each supplier is to set the execution price to be the execution cost and add a margin
on the reservation cost. This implies that suppliers make profits only from the buyer’s
reservation payments. This result does not hold in the case of bids of constant marginal
costs (considered by MS).
We have also shown that, under the assumption that the supply chain optimal profit
is submodular in the set of available suppliers, there is a class of equilibria in which the
buyer’s reservation choice is first best, each supplier’s profit equals his marginal contribu-
tion to the supply chain and the buyer takes the remaining profit. The implication is that
by allowing suppliers to compete using function bids, the supply chain is coordinated.
To demonstrate the generality of the submodularity assumption, we have shown that
the supply chain optimal profit is indeed submodular when each supplier’s marginal
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execution cost is constant, a setting that has been studied extensively in the existing
literature, or when there are only two suppliers.
From an electricity market perspective, the profits for the buyer correspond to the
overall consumer welfare. In this context the capacity mechanism we have described
combines the capacity auction and the market for energy into a single pay-as-bid auction,
rather than having separate uniform price auctions. This achieves an efficient outcome
at equilibrium, even in the case where generators can exercise market power. In the
special case of a competitive environment when no single generator has a significant
impact on overall system welfare when removed, we have found that each generator bids
at cost and we retain the property of an efficient set of capacity and generation choices.
The result we obtain on best response is interesting from the perspective of electricity
capacity mechanisms since it demonstrates that when generators are required to specify
their energy bids in advance with pay-as-bid in the spot, then there is no incentive to use
market power in the energy component of the bids, with profits being made entirely from
the capacity payments. This result applies without an assumption of monotone prices
and allows quite general dispatch mechanisms. This has relevance to the issues of uplift
payments that occur in US wholesale markets because of no-load and start-up costs (see,
for example, Hogan, 2014).
This paper can be extended in several directions. First we assume, as in other sup-
plier competition models, that supplier costs are known to the other suppliers. This
assumption fits some settings better than others. For example, in the electricity mar-
ket, generators tend to know each other’s generation technologies; thus it is prudent to
assume complete cost information. However, in other settings a model that considers
cost uncertainties may be more appropriate; see supply function equilibrium models with
private information (Vives, 2011). In addition, our model focuses on the contract market
only, and incorporation of a spot market would be another interesting direction. Our
equilibrium analysis builds on the submodularity condition. Even though in Example 4
we demonstrate that, when the submodularity property fails, the VCG strategies are not
a Nash equilibrium, it would be interesting to investigate further what the equilibrium
looks like when the supply chain optimal profit is not submodular. Finally, we should
note that our assumption is that the random demand is exogenous. An important exten-
sion that we do not consider is the case where the buyer can influence demand through
setting a price.
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Appendix
In this section, we prove the results derived in this paper and also give some basic
definitions from Murota (2003) for Section 6.
A.1 Some definitions
The set of real numbers is denoted by R, and R¯ = R ∪ {+∞} and R = R ∪ {−∞}.
The set of integers is denoted by Z, and Z¯ = Z ∪ {+∞} and Z = Z ∪ {−∞}. We use
D to denote either Z or R. Denote [n] = {1, . . . , n} for any positive number n. The
characteristic vector of S ⊆ [n] is denoted by χS ∈ {0, 1}n. For i ∈ [n], we write χi for
χ{i}, which is the ith unit vector, and χ0 = 0 (zero vector).
M \-convexity
For a function f : Dn → R ∪ {−∞,+∞}, the set
domDf = {x ∈ Dn : f(x) ∈ R}
is called the effective domain of f . For a vector z ∈ Rn, define the positive and negative
supports of z as
supp+(z) = {i ∈ [n] : zi > 0}, supp−(z) = {i ∈ [n] : zi < 0}.
A function f : Zn → R¯ is said M \-convex if for any x, y ∈ domZf and any i ∈ supp+(x−y),
there exists j ∈ supp−(x− y)∪{0} such that the following exchange property is satisfied:
f(x) + f(y) ≥ f(x− χi + χj) + f(y + χi − χj).
Similarly, a function f : Rn → R¯ is said M \-convex if for any x, y ∈ domRf and any
i ∈ supp+(x− y), there exist j ∈ supp−(x− y) ∪ {0} and λ0 > 0 such that
f(x) + f(y) ≥ f(x− λ(χi − χj)) + f(y + λ(χi − χj))
for all λ ∈ Rn with 0 ≤ λ ≤ λ0. A function f : Dn → R is said M \-concave if (−f) is
M \-convex.
Laminar convexity
A non-empty set L ⊆ 2[n] is called a laminar family if for any A,B ∈ L, we have
A ∩B = ∅, or A ⊆ B, or B ⊆ A. A function f : Dn → R¯ is said laminar convex if it can
be represented as
f(x) =
∑
S∈L
fS(x(S)),
where {fS} are univariate convex functions, L is a laminar family, and x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi.
A function f : Dn → R is said laminar concave if (−f) is laminar convex.
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A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
(a) We consider any feasible offer (P˜i(s), R˜i(t)) from supplier i, giving a set of bids
B˜i = {(Pj(s), Rj(t)) : j ∈ N, j 6= i} ∪ {(P˜i(s), R˜i(t))}.
The buyer can obtain a profit of Π∗Bi(N\{i}) through restricting consideration to choices
with ti = 0 (which also implies si = 0), and so we have a lower bound on buyer profit:
Π∗B˜i(N) ≥ Π
∗
Bi(N\{i}). (A-1)
Taking (t˜, s˜) as an optimal choice by the buyer given bids B˜i, we have
Π∗B˜i(N) = E
[
V (D, s˜(D))−
∑
j 6=i
(Pj(s˜(D)) +Rj(t˜))− (P˜i(s˜(D)) + R˜i(t˜))
]
.
Hence
E
[
P˜i(s˜(D)) + R˜i(t˜))
]
= E
[
V (D, s˜(D))−
∑
j 6=i
(Pj(s˜(D)) +Rj(t˜))
]
− Π∗B˜i(N).
Using ΠBi(t˜, s˜) ≤ Π∗Bi(N) and (A-1), with a complete set of bids B˜i, we can calculate the
profit for supplier i as follows:
E
[
R˜i(t˜)− Ei(t˜) + P˜i(s˜(D))− Ci(s˜(D))
]
= E
[
V (D, s˜(D))−
∑
j 6=i
(Pj(s˜(D)) +Rj(t˜))− Ei(t˜)− Ci(s˜(D))
]
− Π∗B˜i(N)
= ΠBi(t˜, s˜)− Π∗B˜i(N) ≤ Π
∗
Bi(N)− Π∗Bi(N\{i}) = Zi,
as required.
(b) Since Zi > 0, we know that Π
∗
Bi(N) > Π
∗
Bi(N\{i}), which implies that the optimal
choice (t¯, s¯) for the buyer given bids Bi has t¯i > 0, otherwise these two would be the same.
We need to show that when the offer of (P¯i(·), R¯i(·)) is made the buyer will choose supplier
i (i.e., have ti > 0), which will then automatically give a profit of Zi for supplier i from
(2). We will show that (t¯, s¯) is optimal for the buyer given bids
B¯i = {(Pj(s), Rj(t)) : j ∈ N, j 6= i} ∪ {(P¯i(s), R¯i(t))},
and this suffices since i is preferred. Now by definition
Π∗¯Bi(N) = maxt∈T
s(D)∈X(t)
E
[
V (D, s(D))−
∑
j 6=i
(Pj(s(D)) +Rj(t))− (P¯i(s(D)) + R¯i(t))
]
.
Now
ΠB¯i(t¯, s¯) = ΠBi(t¯, s¯)− Zi = Π∗Bi(N)− Zi,
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since t¯i > 0. Now consider an arbitrary choice for the buyer (t, s) with ti > 0. This has
ΠB¯i(t, s) = ΠBi(t, s)− Zi ≤ Π∗Bi(N)− Zi,
and, moreover, any choice (t, s) with ti = 0 has
ΠB¯i(t, s) = ΠBi(t, s) ≤ Π∗Bi(N\{i}) = Π∗Bi(N)− Zi.
Thus we have shown the optimality we needed.
(c) In this case with the bid (Ci(s), R¯i(t)−ε) the profit for supplier i is Zi−ε provided
ti > 0. Given this offer, the buyer by choosing (t¯, s¯), defined in part (b), will achieve a
profit of Π∗Bi(N) − Zi + ε = Π∗Bi(N\{i}) + ε, which is therefore greater than any buyer
profit available when ti = 0. Hence the buyer’s optimal choice must have ti > 0 and this
completes the proof.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
We prove the lemma by induction. It is trivial when |N \ S| ≤ 1, so we begin with
|N \ S| = 2, and we suppose that N = S ∪ {j, k}. From (6), we obtain
Π∗C(N) + Π
∗
C(N \ {j, k}) ≤ Π∗C(N \ {j}) + Π∗C(N \ {k}),
which can be rearranged to obtain the result required. Suppose (7) holds for any S with
|N \ S| = k. Then for j ∈ S, we have∑
i∈N\(S∪{j})
(Π∗C(N)− Π∗C(N \ {i}))
=
∑
i∈N\S
(Π∗C(N)− Π∗C(N \ {i})) + Π∗C(N)− Π∗C(N \ {j})
≤ Π∗C(N)− Π∗C(S) + Π∗C(N)− Π∗C(N \ {j})
≤ 2Π∗C(N)− (Π∗C(N) + Π∗C(S \ {j})) = Π∗C(N)− Π∗C(S \ {j}),
where the first inequality follows from the inductive hypothesis and the second inequality
follows from the submodularity property as assumed. Hence, we establish that the result
holds for |N \ S| = k + 1, which completes the proof.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 2
We prove the lemma by contradiction. Suppose otherwise and there exists j ∈ N∗(C)
and j 6= i such that j /∈ N∗−i(C). By definition, Π∗C(N \ {i}) = Π∗C(N \ {i, j}). Moreover,
inequality (6) implies Π∗C(N \ {i}) + Π∗C(N \ {j}) ≥ Π∗C(N \ {i, j}) + Π∗C(N). Thus,
Π∗C(N \ {j}) ≥ Π∗C(N), which contradicts the fact that j ∈ N∗(C).
A.5 Proof of Theorem 2
We establish that with these bids the profit for supplier i is Π∗C(N) − Π∗C(N\{i}),
and then that given the bids of the other players, no improvement on this is possible
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for supplier i. We consider two cases. First suppose that Π∗C(N) − Π∗C(N\{i}) = 0 then
i /∈ N∗(C) and with bids B¯ supplier i makes zero profit. In the second case i ∈ N∗(C)
and Π∗C(N) > Π
∗
C(N\{i}). This implies that any optimal solution for Π∗C(N) must have
ti > 0.
Next we show that the buyer has an optimal choice (t∗N , s
∗
N) when facing bids B¯. Now
for any feasible (t, s),
ΠB¯(t, s) = E[V (D, s(D))−
∑
i∈N∗(C)
(P¯i(s(D)) + R¯i(t))
−
∑
i/∈N∗(C)
(Ci(s(D)) + Ei(t))]
= E[V (D, s(D))−
∑
j∈N∗(C),tj>0
(Π∗C(N)− Π∗C(N\{j})−∆j(t))
−
∑
i∈N
(Ci(s(D)) + Ei(t))]
= E[V (D, s(D)) +
∑
j∈N∗(C),tj>0
∆j(t)−
∑
i∈N
(Ci(s(D)) + Ei(t))]
−
∑
j∈N
(Π∗C(N)− Π∗C(N\{j})) +
∑
j∈N\I(t)
(Π∗C(N)− Π∗C(N\{j}))
≤ E[V (D, s(D)) +
∑
j∈N∗(C),tj>0
∆j(t)−
∑
i∈N
(Ci(s(D)) + Ei(t))]
−
∑
j∈N
(Π∗C(N)− Π∗C(N\{j})) + Π∗C(N)− Π∗C(I(t)),
where the inequality follows from Lemma 1 and we have used Π∗C(N) − Π∗C(N\{j}) = 0
for j /∈ N∗(C). Since ∆i(t) ≥ 0, using (9) we obtain∑
j∈N∗(C), tj>0
∆j(t) ≤
∑
j∈I(t)
∆j(t) ≤ Π∗C(I(t))− ΠC(t, s)
= Π∗C(I(t))− E[V (D, s(D))−
∑
i∈N
(Ci(s(D)) + Ei(t))].
Substitution into the inequality for ΠB¯(t, s) leads to
ΠB¯(t, s) ≤ Π∗C(N)−
∑
j∈N
(Π∗C(N)− Π∗C(N\{j})). (A-2)
We will show that with the choice (t∗N , s
∗
N) the buyer can achieve this bound. Since
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∑
j∈N ∆j(t
∗
N) = 0, we have
ΠB¯(t
∗
N , s
∗
N) = E[V (D, s∗N(D))−
∑
j∈N
(P¯j(s
∗
N(D)) + R¯j(t
∗
N))]
= E[V (D, s∗N(D))−
∑
j∈N
(Cj(s
∗
N(D)) + Ej(t
∗
N))
−
∑
j∈N∗(C)
(Π∗C(N)− Π∗C(N\{j}))]
= Π∗C(N)−
∑
j∈N
(Π∗C(N)− Π∗C(N\{j})) .
Here we have used the fact that N∗(C) = I(t∗N) and also that Π∗C(N) − Π∗C(N\{j}) = 0
when j /∈ N∗(C). Hence we have established that (t∗N , s∗N) is an optimal choice for the
buyer. By Assumption 1 the buyer choice (t∗N , s
∗
N) that achieves supply chain optimality
is preferred and hence we have ti > 0 , from which it follows that the profit for supplier i
when bids are B¯ is Π∗C(N)− Π∗C(N\{i}). Now we evaluate Π∗¯B(N\{i}). For any feasible
(t, s), the bound (A-2) still applies and hence
ΠB¯(t, s) ≤
∑
j∈N
Π∗C(N\{j})− (|N | − 1)Π∗C(N).
Since
∑
j∈N\{i}∆j(t
∗
N\{i}) = 0 and each ∆j is non-negative we have ∆j(t
∗
N\{i}) = 0 for
each j ∈ N\{i}. Thus
ΠB¯(t
∗
N\{i}, s
∗
N\{i}) = E[V (D, s∗N\{i}(D))−
∑
j∈N∗(C)
(P¯j(s
∗
N\{i}(D)) + R¯j(t
∗
N\{i}))
−
∑
j /∈N∗(C)
(Cj(s
∗
N\{i}(D)) + Ej(t
∗
N\{i}))]
= E[V (D, s∗N\{i}(D))−
∑
j∈N
(Cj(s
∗
N\{i}(D)) + Ej(t
∗
N\{i}))]
−
∑
j∈I(t∗
N\{i})∩N∗(C)
(Π∗C(N)− Π∗C(N\{j}))
= Π∗C(N\{i})−
∑
j∈N∗(C)\{i}
(Π∗C(N)− Π∗C(N\{j})) ,
where the last equality is based on Lemma 2. Hence, as Π∗C(N) = Π
∗
C(N\{j} for j /∈
N∗(C), we have
ΠB¯(t
∗
N\{i}, s
∗
N\{i}) = Π
∗
C(N\{i})−
∑
j∈N,j 6=i
(Π∗C(N)− Π∗C(N\{j}))
=
∑
j∈N
Π∗C(N\{j})− (|N | − 1)Π∗C(N),
and so
(
t∗N\{i}, s
∗
N\{i}
)
is also optimal for the buyer faced with bids B¯. Thus
Π∗¯B(N\{i}) = Π∗¯B(N) =
∑
j∈N
Π∗C(N\{j})− (|N | − 1)Π∗C(N), (A-3)
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and there is no loss to the buyer from a restriction that one of the ti values is zero.
Now suppose that there is a different offer (P˜i(s), R˜i(t)) by one of the suppliers i ∈
N∗(C), giving a set of bids
B˜i = {(P¯j(s), R¯j(t)) : i 6= j ∈ N∗(C)} ∪ {(P˜i(s), R˜i(t))} ∪ {(Cj(s), Ej(t)) : j /∈ N∗(C)}.
The buyer can obtain a profit of Π∗¯B(N\{i}) through restricting consideration to choices
with ti = 0. This follows because B˜i(t) = 0 when ti = 0. We can write this lower bound
on buyer profit as
Π∗B˜i(N) ≥ Π
∗¯
B(N\{i}).
Suppose that (t˜, s˜) is an optimal choice by the buyer given bids B˜i, so
Π∗B˜i(N) = E[V (D, s˜(D))−
∑
j∈N∗(C)\{i}
(P¯j(s˜(D))− R¯j(t˜))
− (P˜i(s˜(D))− R˜i(t˜))−
∑
j /∈N∗(C)
(Cj(s˜(D))− Ej(t˜))].
Given bids B˜i, the profit for supplier i is
E[P˜i(s˜(D)) + R˜i(t˜)− (Ci(s˜(D)) + Ei(t˜))]
= E[V (D, s˜(D))−
∑
j∈N∗(C)\{i}
(P¯j(s˜(D)) + R¯j(t˜))
−
∑
j /∈N∗(C)
(Cj(s˜(D)) + Ej(t˜))− Π∗B˜i(N)− (Ci(s˜(D)) + Ei(t˜))]
= ΠC(t˜, s˜)−
∑
j∈N∗(C)\{i}
t˜j>0
(
Π∗C(N)− Π∗C(N\{j})−∆j(t˜)
)− Π∗B˜i(N).
Since ∆j(t˜) ≥ 0 and Π∗B˜i(N) ≥ Π
∗¯
B(N\{i}), the above quantity is at most
ΠC(t˜, s˜) +
∑
j∈I(t˜)
∆j(t˜)−
∑
j∈N∗(C)\{i}
t˜j>0
(Π∗C(N)− Π∗C(N\{j}))− Π∗¯B(N\{i})
≤ Π∗C(I(t˜))−
∑
j∈N,j 6=i
(Π∗C(N)− Π∗C(N\{j}))
+
∑
j /∈I(t˜),j 6=i
(Π∗C(N)− Π∗C(N\{j}))− Π∗¯B(N\{i})
≤ Π∗C(I(t˜))−
∑
j∈N
j 6=i
(Π∗C(N)− Π∗C(N\{j})) + Π∗C(N)− Π∗C(I(t˜))− Π∗¯B(N\{i})
= Π∗C(N)− (|N | − 1)Π∗C(N) +
∑
j 6=i
Π∗C(N\{i})− Π∗¯B(N\{i}),
where the first inequality is from the fact that functions {∆i(t) : i ∈ N} are consistent
with the costs, while the second inequality is from Lemma 1. We can use (A-3) and
cancel terms to obtain
E[(P˜i(s˜(D)) + R˜i(t˜)− (Ci(s˜(D)) + Ei(t˜))] ≤ Π∗C(N)− Π∗C(N\{i}).
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The final step is to consider an offer (P˜i(s), R˜i(t)) by one of the suppliers i /∈ N∗(C).
For these suppliers there is no profit under the set of bids B¯. We will show that there
is no chance to make a profit with a different bid. It is clear that any choice that has
ti > 0 will give the buyer less than if the same choice was used with the bids B¯, and we
have seen that for B¯ an optimal choice is given by (t∗N , s∗N). Thus this choice that has
ti = 0 (and gives preference to those in the supply chain optimal choice) gives the buyer
at least the same profit as any other and is therefore chosen by the buyer. Hence the
profit made by supplier i with the new offer can never be greater than zero. Thus we
have established that in both cases no other bid can achieve a higher profit for supplier
i, establishing that the bids given in the theorem are indeed a Nash equilibrium.
A.6 Proof of Corollary 1
This is immediate, since Theorem 1 part (a) establishes that supplier i can make no
more than Π∗Bi(N)−Π∗Bi(N\{i}), which by construction is the supplier i profit under the
conditions of the Corollary. Moreover the example of an optimal choice for the supplier
corresponds to part (b) of Theorem 1. Finally, the statement on -optimality follows from
part (c) of Theorem 1.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 1
First we want to show that θi > 0, for i ∈ N∗(C). Assumption 1 is enough (from
uniqueness of the support of supply chain capacity choices) to show (t∗N)i > 0, as we
observed in (5). Then use of submodularity and repeated application of Lemma 2 with
N decreasing in size shows that (t∗S)i > 0 for S ⊆ N .
It suffices to show that the execution and reservation payments induced by p∗i (s) and
r∗i (t) satisfy the conditions given in Theorem 2. It is straightforward that the execution
payment is
∫ si
0
p∗i (s)ds =
∫ si
0
ci(s)ds = Ci(si) for i ∈ N . For i /∈ N∗(C), θi = 0 and thus∫ ti
0
r∗i (t)dt = Ei(ti). For i ∈ N∗(C), we obtain the reservation payment as follows:∫ ti
0
r∗i (t)dt =
∫ ti
0
ei(t) +
∫ min(ti,θi)
0
δi(t; βi)dt
= Ei(ti) + (Π
∗
C(N)− Π∗C(N \ {i}))
∫ min(ti,θi)
0
(βi + 1)
θi
(
θi − t
θi
)βi
dt
= Ei(ti) + (Π
∗
C(N)− Π∗C(N \ {i}))
(
1−
(
θi −min(ti, θi)
θi
)βi+1)
.
Thus,
∆i(ti; βi) = (Π
∗
C(N)− Π∗C(N \ {i}))
(
θi −min(ti, θi)
θi
)βi+1
≥ 0.
Next we show that when all βis are large enough, the set of ∆i(ti; βi) derived from
the power function bids is consistent with the costs. There are two requirements for
consistency, first we need
∑
j∈S ∆j((t
∗
S)j; βj) = 0. This follows because (t
∗
S)j ≥ θj
for j ∈ S, and hence ∆j((t∗S)j; βj) = 0 independent of the choice of βj. The second
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requirement is that for any t with I(t) ⊆ S,∑
j∈S
∆j(tj) ≤ Π∗C(S)− ΠC(t).
The right hand side of this expression is also a sum over the non zero elements of t
from (14). Thus we can look at this inequality on a component by component basis, and
we want to find values of β large enough that, for every t
(Π∗C(N)− Π∗C(N \ {i}))
(
θi −min(ti, θi)
θi
)βi+1
≤ W (t),
where
W (t) =
∫ (t∗S)i
0
{
[ρ− ci(x)]F¯ (h¯i(x, (t∗S)−i))− ei(x)
}
dx
−
∫ ti
0
{
[ρ− ci(x)]F¯ (h¯i(x, (t)−i))− ei(x)
}
dx, (A-4)
and t∗S is optimal for Π
∗
C(S). We note that
Π∗C(N)− Π∗C(N \ {i}) ≤ Π∗C(S)− Π∗C(S \ {i}) ≤ Π∗C(S)− ΠC(t¯∗S,i),
where t¯∗S,i = ((t
∗
S)1, (t
∗
S)2, . . . , (t
∗
S)i−1, 0, (t
∗
S)i+1, . . . , (t
∗
S)n), i.e., it consists of t
∗
S with the
i’th component set to zero. The first inequality here comes from submodularity and the
second from the optimality of Π∗C(S \ {i}). Now we observe that for j 6= i the buyer’s
profit from supplier j, which is∫ (t∗S)j
0
{
[ρ− cj(x)]F¯ (h¯j(x, (t∗S)−j))− ej(x)
}
dx,
is increased by taking out the capacity from supplier i (i.e., moving from t∗S to t¯
∗
S,i) since
h¯j(x, (t
∗
S)−j is reduced. Hence
Π∗C(S) ≤
∑
j∈S,j 6=i
∫ (t¯∗S,i)j
0
{
[ρ− cj(x)]F¯ (h¯j(x, (t¯∗S,i)−j))− ej(x)
}
dx
+
∫ (t∗S)i
0
{
[ρ− ci(x)]F¯ (h¯i(x, (t∗S)−i))− ei(x)
}
dx
= ΠC(t¯∗S,i) +
∫ (t∗S)i
0
{
[ρ− ci(x)]F¯ (h¯i(x, (t∗S)−i))− ei(x)
}
dx.
Thus,
(Π∗C(N)− Π∗C(N \ {i}))
(
θi −min(ti, θi)
θi
)βi+1
≤ Wβi(t),
where
Wβi(t) =
(
θi −min(ti, θi)
θi
)βi+1 ∫ (t∗S)i
0
{
[ρ− ci(x)]F¯ (h¯i(x, (t∗S)−i))− ei(x)
}
dx.
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We need to show that Wβi(t) ≤W (t). Observe from (A-4) that Wβi(t) =W (t) if ti = 0.
Moreover Wβi(t) is zero when ti = θi, and hence Wβi(t) ≤W (t) at ti = θi, with equality
in the case that θi = (t
∗
S)i.
Since (t∗S)i gives the optimal solution for Π
∗
C(S) we know that
∂
∂ti
W (t∗S) =
(
(ρ− ci((t∗S)i)) F¯ (h¯i(ti, (t∗S)−i))− ei((t∗S)i)
)
= 0.
Looking at the second derivative:
∂2
∂t2i
W (t) =
∂
∂ti
(
(ρ− ci(ti)) F¯ (h¯i(ti, (t)−i))− ei(ti)
)
< 0
from our assumptions on the functions ci and ei. The strict inequality here can be
established from observing that F¯ is decreasing and h¯i(ti, (t)−i) is increasing in ti. Now
for ti ≤ θi
∂
∂ti
Wβi(t)= −
(βi + 1)
θi
(
θi − ti
θi
)βi ∫ (t∗S)i
0
{
[ρ− ci(x)]F¯ (h¯i(x, (t∗S)−i))− ei(x)
}
dx,
∂2
∂t2i
Wβi(t)=
(βi + 1)βi
θ2i
(
θi − ti
θi
)βi−1 ∫ (t∗S)i
0
{
[ρ− ci(x)]F¯ (h¯i(x, (t∗S)−i))− ei(x)
}
dx,
which are both zero at ti = θi. Hence a Taylor series expansion shows that for ti close
enough to θi but below it, we will have Wβi(t) < W (t). The multiplier
(
θi−min(ti,θi)
θi
)βi+1
decreases as βi increases and has limit zero for any ti > 0. Note that
∂
∂ti
Wβi(t) decreases
towards −∞ at ti = 0 as βi increases, and so is less than ∂∂tiW (t∗S) for βi large enough.
Hence we can set βi large enough that Wβi(t) < W (t) for all ti ∈ (0, θi). Therefore, we
have established that the set of ∆i(ti; βi) is consistent with the costs.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 2
For submodularity we simply need to show that Π∗C({1, 2}) ≤ Π∗C({1}) + Π∗C({2}). Let
(t∗, s∗(D)) be the optimal supply chain choice when both suppliers are available. Then
Π∗C({1, 2}) = E[V (D, s∗(D))−
∑
i∈{1,2}
(Ci(s
∗(D)) + Ei(t∗))]
= E[V (D, [s∗(D)]1 + [s∗(D)]2)
−
∑
i∈{1,2}
(Ci([s
∗(D)]1 + [s∗(D)]2) + Ei([t∗]1 + [t∗]2))],
where for any vector x we define [x]1 := (x1, 0) and [x]2 := (0, x2). Using subadditivity
of V and the restriction on C and E functions we have
Π∗C({1, 2}) ≤ E[V (D, [s∗(D)]1) + V (D, [s∗(D)]2)−
∑
i∈{1,2}
(Ci([s
∗(D)]i) + Ei([t∗]i))]
= ΠC([t∗]1, [s∗(D)]1) + ΠC([t∗]2, [s∗(D)]2) ≤ Π∗C({1}) + Π∗C({2}).
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The final stage is simply to observe that for the capacity game with function bids, we
have V (D, s) = ρmin(D, s1 + s2) and this is a subadditive function, since
V (D, sA + sB) = min(D, sA1 + sA2 + sB1 + sB2)
≤ min(D, sA1 + sA2) + min(D, sB1 + sB2).
A.9 Proof of Theorem 3
Note that the supply chain optimal profit as a set function can be expressed as follows:
Π∗(σ) = max
{
ΠC(t) : t ≤ σd¯,
}
, σ ∈ {0, 1}n.
According to (3), with the conditions of the theorem, ΠC(t) is laminar concave and hence
M \-concave in t ∈ T (see the Appendix for definition) according to Murota (2003), which
implies that Π˜C(t) = ΠC(td¯) is M \-concave in t ∈ [0, 1]n. For any σ¯ ∈ [0, 1]n, let
Π˜(σ¯) = max
{
Π˜C(t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ σ¯
}
.
We show that Π˜(σ¯) is M \-concave over [0, 1]n. To this end, consider the informal convo-
lution function
Π¯(σ¯) = sup
{
Π¯C(t) + α(t¯) : t + t¯ = σ¯, t, t¯ ∈ Rn
}
, σ¯ ∈ Rn;
where Π¯C(t) = Π˜C(t) −
∑n
i=1 δ[0,1](ti) and α(t¯) = −
∑n
i=1 δ[0,1](t¯i), with Π˜C(t) = −∞ if
t 6∈ [0, 1]n and δ[0,1](·) the indicator function of set [0, 1] (i.e., δ[0,1](x) = 0 if x ∈ [0, 1] and
δ[0,1](x) = +∞ otherwise). It is clear that both Π¯C(·) and α(·) are M \-concave over Rn.
According to Murota (2009, Section 4.2), Π¯(σ¯) is M \-concave over Rn. Note that the
restriction of Π¯(σ¯) on [0, 1]n is exactly Π˜(σ¯), which therefore is M \-concave over [0, 1]n
with straightforward direct verification according to the definition of M \-concavity. We
then conclude that Π˜(·) is submodular over [0, 1]n (Murota and Shioura, 2004), which
implies that Π∗(·), as the restriction of Π˜(·) to {0, 1}n, is submodular over {0, 1}n, as
desired.
On the second part of the theorem for the case of the capacity game with function
bids, we assume that, for each supplier i, the marginal execution cost ci(·) = ci is constant
and the marginal reservation cost ei(·) is non-decreasing. Let 0 ≤ c1 < · · · < cn ≤ ρ. We
will show that ΠC(t) as defined in (14) is laminar concave in t ∈ [0, d¯]n. With constant
ci(·) in (13) we have h¯i(x, t−i) = x+
∑i−1
j=1 tj, x ∈ [0, ti]. Denote ρ¯i = ρ− ci and define
ρi(x, t−i | d) =
{
ρ¯i, if h¯i(x, t−i) ≤ d;
0, otherwise.
We can write
n∑
i=1
∫ ti
0
(ρ− ci)F¯ (h¯i(x, t−i))dx = ED
[
n∑
i=1
ωi(t | d)
]
,
where
ωi(t | d) =
∫ ti
0
ρi(x, t−i | d)dx =
∫ bi(t | d)
0
ρ¯i dx = ρ¯i bi(t | d),
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and bi(t | d) = min{(d−
∑i−1
j=1 tj)
+, ti}. Denote ai = d−
∑i
j=1 tj for i = 0, 1, . . . , n. Then
bi(t | d) = min{a+i−1, ti} = a+i−1 − (a+i−1 − ti)+ = a+i−1 − a+i ,
which leads to
ωi(t | d) = ρ¯i
(
a+i−1 − a+i
)
.
Therefore,
n∑
i=1
ωi(t | d) = ρ¯1 d−
n−1∑
i=1
(ρ¯i − ρ¯i+1)a+i − ρ¯na+n
= ρ¯1 d−
n−1∑
i=1
(ci+1 − ci)
(
d−
i∑
j=1
tj
)+
− ρ¯n
(
d−
n∑
j=1
tj
)+
.
Noticing that both (d− τ)+ and ∫ τ
0
ei(x)dx (1 ≤ i ≤ n) are convex in τ ≥ 0, we conclude
that ΠC(t) is laminar concave with the corresponding laminar family L = {{i} : i ∈
N} ∪ {{1, . . . , i} : i ∈ N}.
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